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CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND THE REGULATION OF C ONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES

Karl Boedecker* & Laurie Lucas**
Paper presented at the Academy of Legal Studies in Business Annual Conference, Denver,
Colorado, August 2009.
I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for regulation of the credit markets are increasing as the worldwide credit crisis continues.
The Group of Twenty’s (G-20) recent meeting in London ended with a communiqué asserting that
“[m]ajor failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision were fundamental
causes of the crisis. Confidence will not be restored until we rebuild trust in our financial system.”1 The
Obama administration also recently issued a white paper calling for the creation of a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency (CFPA) to regulate consumer financial products and services.2 Within the United
States, regulation of the financial services industry is inevitable. While the exact shape of an emerging
regulatory framework is unclear, an increased focus on consumer disclosures for complex financial
products is likely.3

On the one hand, increased regulation of the consumer financial services industry raises
significant issues in the United States which values private industry and freedom of contract over
government interference in the marketplace.4 On the other hand, consumers, particularly in a
capitalistic economy, need complete information to make smart choices. Failure to effectively
convey information to consumers about complex financial products and services may result in
ineffective comparison shopping, unnecessary and burdensome costs and penalties, and eventual
default. Ineffective consumer disclosures also may substantially increase the likelihood of
litigation, and ultimately increase costs for the industry and consumers.
This paper attempts to improve the understanding and efficacy of consumer disclosures
based on the level of a consumer’s sophistication by deconstructing current litigation over
*Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Oklahoma State University. **Professor of Ethics, Social Responsibility and
the Law, University of San Francisco. Copyright the authors. Please do not use or cite without the authors’
permission.
1

Group of Twenty, London Summit, Leaders’ Statement (Apr. 2, 2009).
See Financial Regulatory Reform a New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, available
at http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/index.html [Hereinafter Financial Regulatory Reform]. See also
Elizabeth Warren, Product Safety Regulation as a Model for Financial Services Regulation, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF.
452 (2008) (advocating and explaining the need for a centralized commission to protect consumers using financial
products). Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard law professor, is currently the head of the Congressional Oversight Panel
overseeing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).
3
See e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-024 (requiring
enhanced consumer disclosures under the federal Truth in Lending Act, among other things); Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22 (requiring disclosure to consumer of purchasers and assignees of
consumer’s mortgage loans, among other things); Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act, H.R. 2309, 111th
Cong. (2009) (requires certain disclosures related to fee structures used by providers of debt settlement services,
among other things). See also Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 2 at 57 (one mission of the CFPA would be
to provide information to consumers need to make “responsible financial decisions.”).
4
See e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus Regulation, 7 CHAP. L.
REV. 107 (2004) (article provides an insightful and interesting discussion of freedom of contract among private
parties versus a regulatory environment for the effective management of the marketplace using, by example, the
federal Truth in Lending Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, among other consumer statutes, and ultimately
arguing that the common law process is more responsive to market changes than regulation).
2

consumer disclosures mandated under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or
Act),5 a subchapter of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.6 Whether these disclosures have
been conveyed effectively to a consumer has resulted in substantial litigation and a split in the
federal circuits over both the standards and the procedure used to evaluate the efficacy of the
disclosures.7 Deconstructing this FDCPA precedent may help provide legal practitioners with
the basis for establishing a violation of that Act, and also may provide insight to practitioners in
the consumer financial services industry working to craft more effective consumer disclosures
and avoid the risk of unnecessary and costly litigation.
Part II of this paper briefly reviews the framework of the FDCPA, including the legal
standards currently used by the federal courts when determining whether the Act has been
violated. Part III of the paper reviews the relevant FDCPA precedent and attempts by plaintiffs
to introduce acceptable extrinsic evidence, incorporating insights from the trademark literature.
Part IV of the paper discusses the factors in the FDCPA standard used in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and evaluates the utility of the standard from a marketing and
consumer psychology perspective. The policy implications that flow from the application of
marketing theory to the standard also are discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with
recommendations for future research directed at improving consumer disclosures in the
consumer financial services industry.
II. FDCPA PROHIBITIONS, DISCLOSURES AND CONSUMER STANDARDS
The FDCPA was an attempt to regulate perceived abuses8 in the collection of consumer debts by
third-party debt collectors.9 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the administrative agency
with primary enforcement powers under the Act,10 although the FTC’s staff commentary under
the FDCPA and advisory opinions under the FDCPA are not binding.11 The FDCPA prohibits
certain actions and requires that specific disclosures be made by the debt collectors to protect and
inform consumers about their rights under the Act. The statute is a strict liability statute, so
violations may result in both statutory and actual damages, as well as attorney’s fees.12 Class
action litigation under the Act is common.
5

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (as amended 2006).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.
7
See Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, Consumer Standards under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: A
Case for Regulatory Expansion, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232 (2009) (article provides a thorough doctrinal
explication of the consumer standards under the FDCPA and the resulting split in the federal circuits) [hereinafter
Consumer Standards].
8
15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (“There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection
practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal
bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”).
9
The Act primarily applies to third-party debt collectors, or people collecting debts that are owed to another. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6). When this paper uses the term “debt collector” it means a third-party debt collector as defined
under the Act.
10
15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a).
11
See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (noting that the FTC Staff Commentary is not binding on the FTC or
the public and therefore can be disregarded). See also Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 2 at 58 (proposing
that the CFPA would have sole authority to promulgate regulations under the FDCPA, among other consumer
protection laws).
12
See 15 U.S.C.§§ 1692k(a)(1)-(2)(A) (damages under the Act include actual and statutory damages with the latter
being up to $1000 per action or “the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector” in a
class action).
6
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A. Prohibited Conduct
Under the FDCPA, there are three general categories of prohibited behavior: conduct that
harasses or abuses the consumer;13 conduct that is false, deceptive or misleading to the
consumer;14 and, conduct that is considered an unfair practice.15 The various sections under the
Act provide a non-exhaustive list of actions which might be possible violations. For example, a
debt collector who threatens a consumer or a consumer’s property16 or uses obscenity17 during
attempts to collect a debt may violate the Act if the debt collector’s conduct is found to constitute
harassment or abuse of the consumer. If a debt collector falsely states the amount of the debt
being collected,18 or threatens actions that are not intended or legal,19 the debt collector’s conduct
also may be considered false, deceptive or misleading, violating that section of the Act. Finally,
if a debt collector attempts to collect amounts, other than the debt, which are not allowed by law
or contract,20 those actions may be considered a violation if they are found to be an unfair
practice.
B. Required Disclosures
Debt collectors also are required to make certain disclosures to consumers with the primary
disclosure provision being the validation of debts section of the Act (validation disclosures).21
The Act’s validation disclosures, which must be made in the initial contact or within five days of
an initial “communication” 22 with a consumer, specifically require that the debt collector give
the consumer the following information: a statement of the amount of the debt owed; the name of
the creditor who holds the debt; instructions on how to dispute the validity of the debt;
instructions indicating verification of the debt is available if a written request is made by the
consumer; and instructions on how to make a written request for the name of the original creditor
if that information has changed.23
The most common vehicle for the validation disclosures is a debt collection letter. The
validation disclosures must be conveyed effectively to the consumer, to avoid consumer

13

See 15 U.S.C. §1 692d(1)-(6) (section lists six examples of conduct constituting harassment or abuse—list is not
inclusive).
14
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)-(16) (section lists 16 examples of conduct considered false or misleading—list is not
inclusive).
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)-(8) (section lists eight examples of conduct constituting an unfair practice—list is not
inclusive).
16
15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1).
17
15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2).
18
15 U.S.C. § 1692e (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of a debt.”).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
21
15 U.S.C. § 1692g. There are other disclosures required under the Act, but these are not the paper’s main focus.
See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (this section is frequently referred to as a “mini-Miranda notice” as it requires
disclosure that debt collector is attempting to collect a debt from the consumer and any information obtained will be
used for that purpose).
22
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (“The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly
or indirectly to any person through any medium.”).

23 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5) (Act’s validation of debts section). Subsection (b) also requires that the debt collector cease communication with the consumer until the debt is
verified if the consumer makes the required written request, but is not part of the required disclosures.
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confusion, and not just included in the letter.24 To be an effective conveyance, the validation
disclosures must not be overshadowed or contradicted by other information, directives or visual
cues in the letter in which the disclosures are made.25 Further, if other information, directives or
visual cues in the letter create an apparent, but unexplained contradiction, the validation
disclosures also may be found to be ineffective.26
As noted, while the Act gives some examples of the types of conduct which might be considered
a violation of the Act, these terms are not defined in the statute and the examples included in the
statute are not exhaustive. Additionally, a violation of one section can form the basis for alleging
a violation of another. For example, a debt collector who incorrectly states the amount of the
debt owed may violate not only the validation disclosures requirement, but also the prohibition
against making a false, deceptive or misleading representation while attempting to collect that
debt.27 When violations are alleged by a consumer, a judicial determination of whether that
conduct violates the Act is required.
C. FDCPA Consumer Standards
The federal courts use two different consumer standards when evaluating most types of
violations under the Act: the least-sophisticated consumer standard and the unsophisticated
consumer standard.28 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh and the Eighth Circuits have
adopted the unsophisticated consumer standard, with the remainder of the circuits using the leastsophisticated consumer standard, a theoretically lower standard.29 When a FDCPA violation is
alleged, the courts must determine whether the tactic used by the debt collector would have
confused the consumer about the consumer’s rights under the Act. Most federal courts make this
determination as a matter of law.30 The Seventh Circuit, however, considers violations under the
Act as a mixed question of fact and law.31

24 See, e.g., Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991) (disclosure notices must be effective); Swanson v. Southern Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988)
(same).
25 See, e.g., Chuway v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004) (including a 1-800 for consumer to call regarding payment owed was a violation because it
could confuse a consumer about validation rights); Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991) (placing the validation notice on reverse side of
collection letter and using small gray ink was ineffective); Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., 406 F.3d 410 (7th Cir.

2005) (consumer unsuccessfully argued
that validation notice in initial communication to consumer was overshadowed by information in follow-up letters).
26
See Barlett v. Heible, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A contradiction is just one means of inducing
confusion; "overshadowing" is just another; and the most common is a third, the failure to explain an apparent
though not actual contradiction [.]”). The Barlett court did note that despite this often repeated trio of possible
violations, “[i]t would be better if the courts just said that the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected against
confusion, whatever form it takes.” Id.
27
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(1) (requiring disclosure of “the amount of the debt”) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A)
(prohibits “the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt”) (emphasis added).
28
See generally Consumer Standards, supra note 7 (tracing the evolution of both standards).
29
But see Peter v. GC Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserts that there
is no real difference between the two standards—both are low and require some level of reasonableness—and
therefore they refuse to choose one or the other).
30
See Consumer Standards, supra note 7 at 234-35 (providing overview of cases in which standards were adopted
by federal circuits).
31
Procedurally the other federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, consider alleged violations as a matter of law.
See Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002) (case notes that while the court has adopted the
unsophisticated consumer standard from the Seventh Circuit, it has not adopted the attendant procedural requirement
for extrinsic evidence).
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The primary focus of this paper, therefore, is the FDCPA precedent from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the unsophisticated consumer standard, as that is the only
standard requiring the production of extrinsic evidence, although the insights gleaned from an
analysis of that legal construct also may be helpful in understanding the dimensions of the leastsophisticated consumer standard. Both standards are based on the consumer’s level of
vulnerability, or susceptibility to deception or confusion, although the Seventh Circuit’s
unsophisticated consumer is not as credulous as the least-sophisticated consumer.32 The
Seventh Circuit has made it clear that an unsophisticated consumer “isn’t a dimwit.”33 Rather the
unsophisticated consumer has been variously described in Seventh Circuit precedent as follows:
uninformed, naïve and trusting, but not completely ignorant; possessing a rudimentary
knowledge about the financial world; wise enough to carefully read a collection notice;
reasonably intelligent; capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences; and,
unlikely to interpret debt collection letters in bizarre or idiosyncratic ways.34
In Durkin v. Equifax Check Services, Incorporated,35 the Seventh Circuit articulated the
procedure for demonstrating consumer confusion under the unsophisticated consumer standard.
The Durkin court noted that there may be situations where violations in a debt collection
letter are obvious and the plaintiff will prevail as a matter of law.36 The plaintiff, however, may
not “merely speculate” that an unsophisticated consumer would be confused by a debt collection
letter; rather, the plaintiff needs to introduce acceptable extrinsic evidence, either using “a
carefully designed and conducted consumer survey,” or perhaps “an appropriate expert
witness.”37 To prevail, the plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence needs to demonstrate “that a significant
fraction” of unsophisticated consumers would be confused by whatever tactics or language were
used in the letter at issue in the litigation.38
Previously, the Seventh Circuit pointed to trademark litigation as a basis for crafting
acceptable survey evidence under the FDCPA.39 The court noted that, as in trademark litigation,
an admissible survey must measure not only the level of confusion caused by the tactic or
language at issue in the specific case, but also must include a control group measure which can
provide a “benchmark” of the level of confusion that would be experienced by unsophisticated
consumers if the at-issue tactic or language had not been used.40 The court then would be able to
32

See Consumer Standards supra note 7 at 240 (summing up the precedent underpinning both standards). The
standard used by the courts affects the degree of consumer protection extended and thereby raises significant policy
questions. Courts using the least-sophisticated consumer standard effectively provide more protection to consumers
than courts using the unsophisticated consumer standard because the lower standard increases the likelihood that a
debt collector will be found in violation of the Act, i.e., it is more likely that the least-sophisticated consumer will be
deceived or confused than an unsophisticated consumer.
33
Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
34
See Consumer Standards, supra note 7 at 239 (citations omitted).
35
406 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2004).
36
Id. at 415.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 423. See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The standpoint is
not that of the least intelligent consumer in this nation of 300 million people, but that of the average consumer in the
lowest quartile (or some other substantial bottom fraction) of consumer competence.”) (internal citations omitted).
39
See Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook J., concurring) (citing Gammon
v. GC Servs., L.P., 27 F.3d 1254 at 1260).
40
Id. at 1060-61.
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compare the level of consumer confusion experienced by the universe of unsophisticated
consumers under both treatments and determine whether the at-issue tactic or language had
“unacceptably increase[d] the level of confusion” constituting a violation of the Act.41
Just as in trademark litigation, the proffered evidence also must meet the standards for
professional survey research in order to qualify for admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated, 42 and its progeny, as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence.43
Attempts to comply with the Seventh Circuit’s requirements and the Daubert standards have met
with limited success,44 demonstrating the difficulty of the task.45 Compliance with Daubert
likewise has been difficult under the trademark cases.46 Insight can be gained, however, from
reviewing these attempts within the context of the trademark cases and literature.47
III. FDCPA CONSUMER CONFUSION CASES AND TRADEMARK LAW
A good consumer survey requires a qualified expert, reliability and relevancy.48 After
Durkin, attempts to comply with the Seventh Circuit’s requirements for extrinsic evidence have
been problematic.49 This section of the paper reviews attempts to introduce survey evidence in
recent FDCPA cases, in the light of insights gained from the trademark literature, particularly
recent theoretical and empirical work within that field.50 These cases include determinations
41

Id. at 1060.

42 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (as amended) (codifying holdings in Daubert and Kumho Tire Co.).
44

See Consumer Standards, supra note 7 at 241-44 (reviewing cases through 2007 in the Seventh Circuit requiring
extrinsic evidence and noting difficulty for plaintiffs).
45
See e.g., Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual
Analysis and Empirical Test, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 364 (1993) (noting that experimental methods are extremely
difficult and risky given costs).
46
See e.g., Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 102, 115 (2007) (“The proverbial gold-standard consumer survey design is far from established in
trademark dilution law. … A marketing perspective on trademark dilution law is needed.”); Gary T. Ford, The
Impact of the Daubert Decision on Survey Research Used in Litigation, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 234 (2005)
(provides summary of consumer survey standards after Daubert).
47
See e.g., Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of
Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291 (1992) (exploring problems in trademark law
when using mixed fact/ law standards under the Lanham Act).
48
See Ford supra note 46 at 247-48 (provides summary of consumer survey standards after Daubert). See also Bird,
supra note 46 at 113 (“[A] well-constructed survey must define the universe of consumers to be sampled; select a
representative sample of that universe; ask questions that are clear, precise, and nonleading; use appropriately
trained survey interviewers and interview procedures; ask filter questions to reduce guessing by respondents; and
analyze and report data according to established statistical principles.”) (citing, Shari Diamond, REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000)). See also DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV-3462, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30034 at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (“In assessing the methodology used, courts consider: (1)
whether the proffered conclusion lends itself to verification by the scientific method through testing; (2) whether it
has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether it has been evaluated in light of the potential rate of error of the
scientific technique; and (4) whether it is consistent with the generally accepted method for gathering the relevant
scientific evidence.”) (citing Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1996)).
49
See e.g., Consumer Standards, supra note 7 at 241 (Table summarizing survey cases applying standard through
2007).
50
Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, Sophistication, Bridging the Gap, and the Likelihood of
Confusion: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 913 (2008) (study finding some empirical
support for hypothesis that some sophisticated consumers may be more likely to experience confusion in a
hypothetical brand extension by luxury automakers to notebook computers) [hereinafter Empirical Analysis];
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about whether the selected expert was qualified, the survey methodology was appropriate, the
proper survey methods were used, and, perhaps most importantly, the correct consumer universe
was surveyed.
A. Qualified Expert Witnesses
A good expert witness needs to be qualified in the relevant subject area and able to fully
articulate the methodology used in the survey.51 This was an issue in Durkin, discussed above,
wherein the court rejected the plaintiff’s expert witness, a linguist, because he was unable to
articulate the methodology he had used to reach his conclusions.52 Additionally, the district
courts have excluded expert testimony because of a failure to articulate the methodology used
when they have testimony from an expert qualified in the relevant area of law, but not consumer
psychology, or vice versa.53 The Seventh Circuit also recently found that plaintiffs who did hire
an expert in survey research to administer a survey made a “mistake” by allowing their attorney
to draft the survey questions which were then excluded.54
B. Appropriate Methodology
Use of an appropriate methodology also is required under the FDCPA precedent. While
the Seventh Circuit allows testimony from an expert witness to establish consumer confusion,55
the preference appears to be for extrinsic empirical evidence like a professional consumer
survey.56 Assessments of the readability and design analysis of debt collection letters have been
Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the
Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575 (2008) (article provides theoretical model of consumer sophistication
based on consumer psychology for use in establishing validity of consumer confusion factor in trademark cases;
equates consumer sophistication with consumer care) [hereinafter Consumer Psychology]; Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (empirical
study of trademark decisions indicates that decisions are usually made with only a few of the factors from the
multifactor trademark tests; Beebe urges the use of a streamlined national multifactor test); Julie Manning Magid,
Anthony D. Cox & Dena S. Cox, Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1 (2006) (offering conceptual framework for randomized studies to measure trademark dilution).
51
See Ford, supra note 46 at 247.
52
Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff did not present a consumer
survey, but relied on expert witness testimony which the district court found unreliable and irrelevant. Id. at 420.
53
See McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F.2d 736 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (excluded expert testimony from a law professor
because it contained inappropriate legal conclusions and opinions regarding the statute at issue in the case and
because of a failure to use consumer research). Cf. Holt v. Wexler, No. 98 C 7285, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5244, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (expert witness trained in finance but not relevant area of law or “communication,
rhetoric, psychology or sociology” not qualified to give opinions regarding FDCPA); White v. Fin. Credit. Corp.,
No. 99-C-4022, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21486 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2001) (expert unable to articulate methodology
used in “casual survey” of undergraduate students).
54
Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2009) (survey questions were leading).
55
Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2004) (use of testimony from “an appropriate
expert might suffice.”).
56
See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (extrinsic evidence must meet
requirements for “professional survey research” to be admissible); Ford supra note 46 at 249 (Supreme Court’s
preference is likely for empirical rather than opinion evidence). Even assuming such a preference, what type of
survey is appropriate still may be an issue. See e.g., Magid, Cox & Cox, supra note 50 at 26-28 (arguing for
superiority of randomized experiments over consumer surveys, at least when attempting to prove trademark
dilution).
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rejected,57 and the use of telephonic survey methods discouraged.58 As in trademark litigation,
the best survey method depends on the issue being litigated,59 but the mall-intercept survey is
probably among the most cost effective approach for use under the FDCPA.60
The Seventh Circuit also requires the use of a control group regardless of the
methodology selected. 61 As noted above, the requirement of a control group is meant to provide
a benchmark or baseline level of confusion that might be caused by the statutory language
itself.62 Alternatively, the survey’s control for confusion might be language from one of the
57

See Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2004). The fact that the expert focused on the
“overall readability” of debt collection letters in general, rather than the specific language from letters at issue in the
litigation, was a primary reason the court rejected the expert’s testimony; the expert’s testimony was not offered to
prove the at-issue language would increase an unsophisticated consumer’s level of confusion. Id. at 420-21. Sims v.
GC Servs., L.P., 445 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (expert testimony irrelevant using readability and design analysis
because expert did not review letters at issue in litigation and did not offer extrinsic evidence of consumer
confusion).
58
Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We add parenthetically that a
telephone survey is not an ideal method of testing the understanding of a written statement, since inflection can alter
meaning and some written statements are easier to understand when read than when heard.”).
59
See Itama Simonson, Trademark Infringement from the Buyer Perspective: Conceptual Analysis and
Measurement Implications, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 181 (1994) (all methods of measuring likelihood of
consumer confusion are flawed, so the better approach is to choose best method for particular situation; article
evaluates several used in trademark litigation with empirical data from field studies).
60
Cf. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., No. 1:05-CV-0140-DFH-TAB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91879,
*2-3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (after reversal and on remand, granting plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss (with prejudice but without costs or Rule 11 sanctions), noting that “Ms. Evory and her attorneys have
concluded that the prospects of success are slim enough that it is not worth spending $25,000 or more to conduct the
survey.”). But cf. Magid, Cox & Cox, supra note 50 at 26 (when demonstrating trademark dilution, these authors
assert that randomized experiments are superior to consumer surveys to establish confusion).
61
See Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2009) (survey flawed—needs control group);
Hernandez v. Attention, L.L.C., 429 F.Supp.2d 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (survey must include a control group
because “the issue is not merely the meaning of the letter, but whether the contested language significantly increases
the level of confusion over that potentially caused by the Validation Notice itself.”) (citations omitted).
62
The statue’s validation notice requirements read as follows:
(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of
any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication
or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing –
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt
collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day
period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification
of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt
collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different
from the current creditor.
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many safe-harbor cases that the Seventh Circuit has issued for use in the Seventh Circuit.63 A
plaintiff’s failure to use the statutory language or the safe-harbor language in a control group
treatment has resulted in the rejection of surveys on the grounds that the control language that
was used was not reliable.
For example, two district court cases recently addressed this issue in cases where
settlement offers with a 35-day deadline for acceptance were made in letters to consumers, a
commonly used collection strategy. The plaintiffs argued this offer would confuse consumers
about their rights in the validation disclosures, which provide the consumer 30 days to dispute
the validity of the debt, and also that the statement was false, deceptive and misleading, since the
debt collector would likely have extended the offer after the 35-day deadline had expired. The
same survey expert was used in both cases. In both cases, the safe-harbor language offered in
Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C.,64 for use in this type of collection letter, was not
included in the control group treatment and the surveys were rejected.65 In situations where the
at-issue language in a case does not lend itself to a control group treatment based on the statutory
language66 or a safe-harbor case,67 the Seventh Circuit has indicated that the control group could

15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(1)-(5). Most validation disclosures closely track this statutory language. A typical validation
disclosure in a debt collection letter might read as follows:
Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this
debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing
within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof,
this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such
judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this
office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor.
Hernandez v. Attention, L.L.C., 429 F.Supp.2d 912, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The issue in Hernandez was whether the
additional language in the collection letter that stated “[y]our failure to remit the balance due will result in our
agency continuing our collection efforts[,]” would confuse an unsophisticated debtor about how much time he had to
request validation. Id.
63
The Seventh Circuit has provided safe-harbor language to help debt collectors avoid a violation of § 1692e’s
prohibition against false or misleading statements when the debt collector offers to settle a debt by a deadline, at less
than face value. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (court offered the
following additional language as a safe harbor: “We are not obligated to renew this offer.”). The court also offered
language to avoid a misstatement of the amount of a debt that varies daily. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick,
Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000). A complete letter was drafted to help debt collectors
avoid liability for indicating that a consumer may be sued within the 30-day validation period (or that the debt
collector might take any action within that period). Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997).
64
505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007). See also supra note 63 (cites to safe-harbor cases).
65
Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C-5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601 at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009) (“[W]ithout
the [safe harbor] language included, the results gleaned from the control group do not provide reliable evidence as to
whether the settlement offer contained in the initial collection letter was misleading.”); DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs.,
No. 05-CV-3462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034 at *17-18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (“[T]he safe harbor language
provides an outer boundary for the kind of language that protects creditor interests as much as possible without
becoming misleading or deceptive.”).
66
Like a letter that included only the statutory validation disclosures plus a statement of the debt. See Johnson v.
Rev. Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1999).
67
See supra note 63 (cites to safe-harbor cases).
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be “shown a wording of the dunning letter that the [parties] agreed would not be confusing or
that simply omitted the challenged sentence.”68
Even with the use of a control group, the survey still must demonstrate that the
consumer’s level of confusion was unacceptably increased by the at-issue language in the
collection letter69 which will require measurement of how much confusion is caused by the
statute, the safe-harbor language, or an acceptable control group treatment which omits the
disputed language.70 As in trademark cases, defining what constitutes confusion71 and how
much is required to demonstrate a violation also remains an issue under the FDCPA. The
Seventh Circuit has not yet had a case where they could begin to establish precedent on this
critical issue.72 In reported cases where levels of confusion between two survey treatment
groups were compared, the surveys were rejected on other grounds, and the courts did not
address the specific issue.73 In the trademark litigation, surveys demonstrating a 27.7% level of
consumer confusion have been accepted as proof of a likelihood of confusion, and a 40% level of
consumer confusion nationally as proof of actual confusion.74 Beebe notes that courts have

68

Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2009). In Muha, the plaintiffs had argued
that language in collection letter stating “your original agreement with the abovementioned creditor has been
revoked[,]” was false, misleading and confusing. Id. at 625.
69
See Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1994).
70
In DeKoven , the plaintiff argued that the Seventh Circuit’s safe-harbor language had not been subjected to a
consumer survey to determine how much confusion that language would cause an unsophisticated consumer,
making it unnecessary to include the safe-harbor language in the control group’s letter. The district court held that
the safe-harbor language was not confusing as a matter of law. Id. at *17. A valid measurement of how much
confusion the safe-harbor language caused an unsophisticated consumer, however, would be necessary to provide a
benchmark for comparing survey group treatment. In DeKoven, the plaintiff’s control group treatment did omit the
challenged language which would appear to conform to the Seventh Circuit’s statements regarding appropriate
control group treatment choices, even though safe-harbor language was available and not used. See Muha v. Encore
Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2009).
71
See e.g., Ellen R. Foxman, Phil W. Berger & Joseph A. Cote, Consumer Brand Confusion: A Conceptual
Framework, 9 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 123 (1992) (noting difficulty of distinguishing “brand confusion” from
uncertainty, miscomprehension, infringement or deception and offering a framework based on stimulus, individual
and situational factors); Arlene A. Hahn, Bernadette McCann Ezring & Jeffrey Steck, Seventh Circuit Adopts
Second Circuit Interpretation of the Causes Dilution Element of Trademark Dilution Act Claim, Requiring
Demonstration of Likelihood of, Not Actual, Dilution, 13 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. LAW J. 17 (2001) (Seventh Circuit
rejects precedent from other federal circuits and only requires proof of likelihood of dilution, not actual dilution).
72
The Seventh Circuit noted recently that the FDCPA does not define “confusion,” but given that the overall
purpose of the Act was preventing “abusive debt collection practices,” any claim that a debt collection practice was
“false, deceptive or misleading,” may consider, for example, whether the at-issue language would have an
“intimidating effect” on the unsophisticated consumer or would confuse such a consumer about his rights under the
Act. See Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
73
See DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV-3462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) In this
offer to settle case, 58.8% of respondents who received the letter with the at-issue language did not believe the offer
would be extended, while 23.8% of respondents in the control group did. Id. at *18. Survey was rejected on other
grounds; Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C-5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009) (survey
with data from two treatment groups failed because it did not include safe-harbor language). See also Jackson v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (although survey showed 82.5% of respondents
read the letter as making a one-time offer to settle, the offer was in fact truthful, and the survey did not measure
whether the truthful offer to settle confused any of those respondents).
74
See e.g., Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence: Review of Current Trends in the Ninth Circuit, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 715 (2005).
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found trademark infringement when evidence indicated consumer confusion was “as little as
15%, or even 8.5%[.]”75
C. Proper Survey Methods
The overall questionnaire design and the construction of survey questions also must
conform to proper behavioral research standards.76 Proper survey design is needed,77 including
questions that are clear,78 control for bias against debt collectors and the industry,79 discourage
guessing,80 and do not lead the respondent.81 Two recent cases help demonstrate just how
difficult it is to get a survey admitted and also the problems for practitioners inherent in the
common law process.82
Plaintiffs in both cases used closed-end survey questions, the same expert and similar
survey techniques; the basic interview process—described in one of the cases—was as follows:
[a]s each closed-end question was asked, the interviewer handed a printed card to the
respondent visualizing the options and reflecting the order in which the options were
presented verbally. The visual cards were used to aid interviewees in responding and
eliminate any need to memorize the options. Each card gave interviewees the opportunity
to say “don’t know” or “not sure” if they could not offer an opinion. 83
The judges in the cases, however, ruled differently on the issue of survey design, with Kubert
holding that the failure to read the option to the interviewee invalidated the survey, even though
the option was printed on the response card given to the interviewee;84 and, DeKoven holding
75

Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2038 (2005).
See supra note 48. See e.g., Hernandez v. Attention, L.L.C., 429 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (survey flawed
because only 40 respondents were sampled).
77
See e.g., Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (surveys must measure
respondent’s level of confusion not respondent’s belief about an unsophisticated consumer’s level of confusion).
78
See e.g., Jackson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (survey flawed because it
did not define key terms used in questions like, “limited-time offer”); Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 441
F.Supp.2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007)
(survey question flawed because it did not define what was meant by “limited-time offer” for respondents).
79
See e.g., Jackson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (survey flawed because it
did not ask questions designed to determine whether respondents were biased against debt collectors); Hernandez v.
Attention, L.L.C., 429 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (survey flawed because it did not control for bias against debt
collectors).
80
See Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C-5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601(N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009) (survey
interviewers failure to read the “don’t know/not sure” choice to respondents was not a fatal flaw because choice was
included on written response card—survey inadmissible on other grounds.); DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV3462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (failure of interviewer to read the “don’t know/not
sure” choice to respondents was a fatal flaw because choice was included on written response card. ).
81
See e.g., Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2009) (survey flawed because questions
were leading).
82
These cases both came from the Eastern Division of the Northern District Court for the Seventh Circuit
demonstrating that not even proximity leads to consensus on these topics. See Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601(N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009) (Coar, J.) ; DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV-3462,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (Kocoras, J.).
83
See DeKoven, supra note 88 at *14-15 (survey was rejected on other grounds).
84
See Kubert, supra note 80 at *10-11 (“For those respondents, [who were not read the option] the danger that their
response represents a guess rather than an actual assessment of the language presented is apparent.”).
76
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that only the failure to include the option at all on the written response card and not the failure to
read it to the interviewee would invalidate the survey.85 In support, both courts relied on the
Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. The contradictory holdings
under nearly identical facts illustrate how difficult the process can be for survey experts and
highlight the need for further research, particularly since an appellate level decision will now be
required to resolve the split in the district courts. In the trademark literature, the inclusion of an
“I don’t know/not sure” response—regardless of whether it is printed on a response card and/or
read to the respondent—or whether it deters guessing also is debated.86
In sum, while the Seventh Circuit directed practitioners to the trademark cases in its
initial determination that extrinsic evidence would be needed to demonstrate consumer confusion
under the FDCPA, a review of the trademark literature indicates the difficulty practitioners have
had in that arena and the FDCPA cases appear to mirror those difficulties. In response, some
trademark scholars have called for pre-approval of surveys by the courts or the relevant
administrative agency and/or the use of survey rules that could provide a foundation for survey
design.87 Asking for preapproval of survey design has been met with mixed results in the
Seventh Circuit, but a recent FDCPA unpublished opinion, in light of the above discussion on
closed-end survey questions, illustrates that there also are problems with a pre-approval
approach.
In Hubbard v. Midland Credit Management, Incorporated,88 the plaintiff asked the court
to review her proposed survey over the defendants’ objections.89 Hubbard also was a settlement
offer case wherein the plaintiff was alleging that the debt collector’s willingness to take payment
after the time limit stated in the letter had expired constituted a false and misleading statement.90
85

See DeKoven supra note 80 at *16.
Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys-Social “Science” as Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 957, 984 (2002)
(“Including “I don’t know” option is, in this author’s opinion, less likely to encourage guessing and thus may be a
harmless practice, although not of real value.”); Jacob Jacoby, A Critique of Rappeport’s “Litigation Surveys—
Social ‘Science’ as Evidence,” 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1480, 1483 (2002) (“[W]hen a DK [I don’t know] answer
category is not included, closed-ended questions become biased and can give seriously misleading results.
…Logically, DK response options should be included.”); Michael Rappeport, A Rejoinder to a Critique, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 1502, 1507 (2002) (“The empirical evidence is beyond dispute that whether they [“I don’t know”
instructions] conceivably do any good is dependent on the subject matter, the structure of the survey, the particular
question, and the nature of the respondents. As such, it is impossible to extrapolate from specific cases to general
rules about the use of such instructions.”).
87
See Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural Treatment of Trademark
Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1058 (2007) (article argues for the adoption of survey
rules to set the floor for survey admissibility and also preapproval of surveys noting that “[t]he legal situation of
trademark surveys…rests on an uneasy foundation.”). But cf. Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys-Social
“Science” as Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 957, 961-62 (2002) (“t]he constant search for a model survey
represents a refusal to accept the basic principle that any survey is the calling of witnesses in a specific case to testify
about a specific set of “facts,” where those reflect the respondents’ (witnesses’) own perceptions. Once one accepts
that presenting a survey in court is no more than recounting of the (hopefully clarifying ) testimony of witnesses,
why would anyone expect a model to exist?”).
88
No. 1:05-CV-0216-DFH-TAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13938 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 23, 2009).
89
In Hubbard, the court noted that in another district court case, the judge had refused the same request (citing
Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C-5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009)) and noted that
concerns expressed by the judge in Kubert, discussed throughout Part III. of this paper, did not persuade the “court
that it would always be error for a district court to exercise its discretion to entertain such a motion[.]” Hubbard
supra note 88 at * 2-3.
90
Hubbard had previously been reversed and remanded after the district court had dismissed the case on the
pleadings. Hubbard v. Midland Credit Mgmt., NO. 1:05-cv-0216-DFH-TAB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102982 (S.D.
86
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The plaintiff in Hubbard indicated the proposed use of a mall-intercept survey, although the
court did not discuss whether the “mall shoppers” intended as the survey universe would be
appropriate; the planned survey universe included “40 [mall shoppers] who had no education
beyond high school and 40 with at least some college.”91 The proposed survey would control for
bias by asking the shoppers whether they had used consumer credit and determining if the
prospective respondents had ever worked in or had family members working in the debt
collection industry.92 The proposed control group treatment did not use the relevant safe-harbor
language, but instead planned to use a letter without the language that indicated there was a time
limit to the offer to settle for less than the amount of the debt.93 Finally, in yet another iteration
of the closed-end question debate, the proposed survey did not include either a “don’t know/not
sure” verbal or written instruction.94
Although the court noted that it did not have “the benefit of expert testimony or a truly
adversarial presentation” of the proposed survey, the proposed survey demonstrated too many
problems, including the failure to include a “Don’t know/not sure” response, and denied the
plaintiff’s motion.95 Another district court judge recently summed up the problem of interpreting
survey methodology for the district courts in the Seventh Circuit:
Each successive survey is slightly closer to being factual evidence that could be used to
determine whether a sufficiently large segment of the unsophisticated are likely to be
deceived, but each survey has thus far failed. The confounding state of jurisprudence on
the FDCPA in this circuit avoids the problem of federal judges deciding an issue they are
not best equipped to decide (whether unsophisticated consumers would be deceived by a
particular debt collection statement) by asking them instead to determine yet another
issue they are not best equipped to decide (whether a consumer survey comports with
reliable scientific methodology).96
The FDCPA survey cases discussed herein do represent a bit of a paradox for the district courts.
Even one of the most detailed appellate cases to date dealing with the contents of consumer
surveys reflects these contradictions.
In Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C.,97 the court held that including the word
“obligated” in the safe-harbor language offered for use in settlement offer cases was so
“strong…even the unsophisticated consumer will realize that there is a renewal possibility but
that it is not assured[,]” while at the same time requiring the use of extrinsic evidence to
demonstrate consumer confusion because “[t]he intended recipients of dunning letters are not
federal judges, and judges are not experts in the knowledge and understanding of unsophisticated
consumers facing demands by debt collectors.”98 Regardless of such inconsistencies, measuring
Ind. Dec. 19, 2008), rev’d Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (claim made
proceed with the use of appropriate extrinsic evidence), and class certification granted sub nom. Hubbard v. M.R.S.
Assocs., Inc., NO. 1:05-cv-0218-DFH-TAB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102983 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2008).
91
Hubbard, No. 1:05-cv-0216-DFH-TAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13938 at *4-5.
92
Id. at *5.
93
Id. at *9-10.
94
Id. at *6-9. In this proposed survey methodology all the answer choices would be read to respondent.
95
Id. at *10-11.
96
DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV-3462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034, at *10-20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009).
97
505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007).
98
Id. at 776. See also supra note 63 (cites to safe-harbor cases and language from Evory).
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the level of confusion the “intended recipients of dunning letters” experience, of course, rests on
the presumption that the appropriate consumer universe was identified and surveyed.
D. Relevant Consumer Universe
Bird has argued that determining the appropriate survey universe in trademark litigation
is a crucial decision and “represents one of the most significant challenges a survey expert will
face in drafting a consumer survey.”99 Under the FDCPA, this problem is compounded by the
fact that the survey universe also must meet the statutory definitions for “consumers”100 and
“debt,”101 in addition to the dimensions of “unsophisticated consumer” construct used in the
Seventh Circuit.102 The amorphous quality of the legal construct, gleaned from disparate cases at
the district, and even fewer at the appellate level, adds to that difficulty.103
Given these requirements, at a minimum, a valid FDCPA survey must demonstrate that
the respondents were natural persons, without bias against the debt collection industry, who
have been obligated to pay a consumer debt at some point and who fall within “the lowest
quartile (or some other substantial bottom fraction) of consumer competence.”104 Valid proxies
for consumer sophistication are required.105 For example, in a case using a mall-intercept survey
method, the consumer universe was described as “80 consumers, 40 of whom had completed
high school or less and 40 of who had at least completed some college[,]”106 while another used
a mall-intercept survey of “160 users of credit[.]”107 Neither case, however, discussed whether
the appropriate consumer universe had been surveyed because, as noted above, the surveys were
invalidated on other grounds. The Seventh Circuit did recently note that a random survey of
99

Robert C. Bird, Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: an Examination of the Concept of Universe in
Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 276 (1998).
100
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (“The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay
any debt.”). See Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 441 F.Supp.2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, Evory v. RJM
Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (survey rejected in part because it did not consider
FDCPA definition of “consumer”).
101
15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5) (“The term “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money
arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,…[.]”).
102
See Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 441 F.Supp.2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, Evory v. RJM
Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (survey must demonstrate adequate proxy used to
establish respondents were “unsophisticated consumers”).
103
See also supra note 34 for the dimensions of the “unsophisticated consumer” construct.
104
Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007).
105
See e.g., Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 441 F.Supp.2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, Evory v. RJM
Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (expert could not articulate why consumer universe—
those with a high school education or less—was an adequate proxy for sophistication; one, but not the, fatal flaw
found in the survey). See also Beebe supra note 72 at 2035-36 (noting that consumer sophistication regarding source
confusion of trademarks includes factors like “age, gender, education level, cognitive style, and experience with the
trademarked product and product area.”). Beebe also notes that the higher the level of a consumer’s “search
sophistication,” the less protection required because these consumers pay more attention to their product purchasing
decisions. Id. at 2038. But cf. Daniel J. Howard, Roger A. Kerin & Charles Gengler, The Effects of Brand Name
Similarity on Brand Source Confusion: Implications for Trademark Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING
250 (2000) (study finding that “highly motivated consumers may evidence more brand source confusion than
unmotivated consumers, depending on the nature of the brand similarity presented, such as when brand names share
a common meaning.”).
106
DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05-CV-3462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30034 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009)
107
Kubert v. AID Assocs., No. 05-C-5865, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38601 at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009).
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consumers rather than a survey of unsophisticated consumers could only benefit a defendant,
(presumably because it increases the average level of sophistication for the total group of
consumers surveyed making a violation less likely) even though “a better survey would include
questions designed to filter out the sophisticated[.]”108 Defining the appropriate survey universe
and appropriate proxies for sophistication under the unsophisticated consumer standard likely
will require more litigation. The requirement by the Seventh Circuit, however, that appropriate
proxies for the factors in the unsophisticated consumer construct be justified can be met using
insights from marketing and consumer psychology literature. This perspective may provide
insight for practitioners trying to comply with the standard, as well as adding to a better
understanding of what constitutes an effective disclosure for consumer financial products.
IV. THE UNSOPHISTICATED CONSUMER STANDARD
As noted above,109 the factors making up the unsophisticated consumer standard, like
many of the terms used in the FDCPA, are largely undefined and gleaned from the cases. Part
IV of the paper, therefore, reviews the factors in the unsophisticated consumer standard through
the lens of marketing and consumer psychology to evaluate whether the factors used in the
standard make sense under the FDCPA. Insights from marketing theory are then used as a basis
for discussing the policy implications of the unsophisticated consumer standard under the
FDCPA specifically and consumer disclosures generally.
A. Factors in the Unsophisticated Consumer Standard
As noted above, the unsophisticated consumer standard includes factors that encompass
both individual ability and behavior as they relate to consumer sophistication.110 The Seventh
Circuit FDCPA cases assume that the more sophisticated a consumer is, the less likely it is that
the consumer will be confused.111 Only an unsophisticated consumer is likely be confused by a
false, deceptive or misleading tactic, or about his rights in the collection process.112
In trademark law, the context is similar. The relevant issue in trademark litigation is
demonstrating a likelihood of confusion, but the confusion has a slightly different focus:
whether the consumer was confused about the source or sponsorship of goods or services.113 The
relevant consumer universe also is different under trademark law with the focus on the ordinary
consumer, not the unsophisticated consumer. More importantly, the level of the consumer’s

108

Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt. Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2009). The Muha court affirmed the district
court’s exclusion of the survey but reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant and remanded the case,
noting, “there is enough indication of confusion to place a burden of production on the defendant,” to explain what
was meant by the challenged language. Id. at 630.
109
See supra text accompanying note 34.
110
See supra note 34 (elements of unsophisticated consumer standard).
111
See supra note 26.
112
Of course, even if a debt collector makes a false, or deceptive or misleading statement, without a demonstration
that a significant portion of unsophisticated consumers were confused by said statement, there is no violation. See
Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 556 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2009) (“If a statement would not mislead the
unsophisticated consumer, it does not violate the FDCPA—even if it is false in some technical sense.”). The Seventh
Circuit also has indicated that “[a] statement cannot mislead unless it is material, so a false but non-material
statement is not actionable.” Hahn v. Triumph P’ship L.L.C., 557 F.3d 755. 758 (7th Cir. 2009).
113
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006).
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sophistication is just one factor among many that courts use to make a determination of the
likelihood of confusion.114
The approach under the FDCPA is different. Consumer sophistication is not just one
factor among many used to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion. Rather, the
consumer’s sophistication level defines the parameters of the consumer universe which the court
has deemed are in need of the Act’s protection;115 and, even then, the court would extend
protection only if extrinsic evidence demonstrated that a significant proportion of those
unsophisticated consumers were likely to be confused by the challenged action.116
The factors that define the parameters of the unsophisticated consumer standard include
individual abilities like a basic knowledge of finance, reasonable intelligence, and the ability to
make basic logical deductions and inferences, even if that same consumer is uninformed, naïve
or trusting.117 The unsophisticated consumer also is presumed to exhibit specific reasonable
behavior, including the willingness to carefully read and avoid bizarre interpretations of a debt
collection letter.118
There is support in the marketing and consumer psychology literature for the idea that
consumer sophistication can best be viewed on a continuum,119 and there is a great depth of
research supporting the theory that both consumer characteristics—or abilities—and consumer
behaviors—or motivation—should be considered when measuring sophistication.120 The
trademark cases also generally assume that the more sophisticated a consumer is, the more
careful that consumer will be in making purchases, decreasing the likelihood of confusion.121
Lee, Christensen and DeRosia offer a theoretical model designed to evaluate the validity of these
assumptions in the trademark cases using consumer psychology literature that also emphasizes
individual ability and behavior, specifically motivation or “need for cognition,” to evaluate
various factors in the multifactor trademark test.122
114

See e.g., These factors are frequently referred to as the “Polaroid factors,” because they were first enunciated in a
case with that style. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2nd Cir. 1961) (articulating an
eight-factor test).
115
See Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he law is primarily
intended to protect the unsophisticated consumer, since the sophisticated one can usually fend for himself (that is
what “sophistication” means in this context).”).
116
See supra Part II. C and Part III.B (discussing need for control group and demonstration of significant level of
confusion).
117
See Muha, 558 F.3d at 626-27. But see Consumer Standards, supra note 7 at 246 n.208 (suggesting that
consumers who demonstrate these characteristics and behaviors are more likely to be sophisticated consumers rather
than unsophisticated or even reasonable consumers).
118
See Muha, 558 F.3d at 626-27.
119
See e.g., Philip A. Titus & Jeffrey L. Bradford, Reflections on Consumer Sophistication and its Impact on Ethical
Business Practice, 30 J. CONSUMER AFF. 170, 174 (1996) (“Consumer sophistication can be viewed as a continuum
with consumers possessing varying levels of knowledge, experience, and ability….”).
120
See e.g., Titus & Bradford, supra note 119 at 173 (reviewing early marketing literature focusing on consumer
sophistication measured by individual characteristics and urging that an understanding of “sophisticated consumer
behavior” also is required); Debora J. MacInnis, Christine Moorman & Bernard J. Jaworski, Enhancing and
Measuring Consumers’ Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability to Process Brand Information from Ads, 55 J
MARKETING 32 (1991); Deborah J. MacInnis & Bernard J. Jaworski, Information Processing from Advertisements:
Toward an Integrative Framework, 53 J. MARKETING 1 (1989); John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, The Need for
Cognition, 52 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 116 (1982).
121
See Consumer Psychology, supra note 50 at 579 (noting that courts alternatively refer to “consumer
sophistication” as the “consumer’s degree of care”).
122
See Id. An empirical work, using aspects of the theoretical model, tested the consumer sophistication factor,
among others, and found some support for the finding that the consumer’s education level and product experience
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In the FDCPA cases, the Seventh Circuit assumes that an unsophisticated consumer will
exert a minimum level of motivation—the unsophisticated consumer is likely to carefully read
and understand a debt collection letter. This assumption underpins the court’s requirement that
any extrinsic evidence offered must demonstrate that a significant proportion of unsophisticated
consumers in the survey universe were confused by the at-issue language used in a debt
collection letter and not just demonstrate that confusion occurred.
The consumer psychology literature tends to support this assumption, but only if the
unsophisticated consumer also enjoys the minimum level of abilities the court ascribes to this
consumer universe, since motivation alone does not guarantee an absence of confusion.123 Since
the court presumes this minimum level of reasonable behavior or motivation as a matter of law,
empirically verifying it using a scale which measures motivation and/or need for cognition is
probably not necessary for litigation purposes.124 An unsophisticated consumer, however, may
lack the ability to understand a collection letter, even if properly motivated (or presumed by law
to be properly motivated) to carefully read the letter, making this unsophisticated consumer more
vulnerable to confusion.
B. Unsophisticated or “Vulnerable” Consumers
In other words, the Seventh Circuit does not assume that all consumers in the
unsophisticated consumer survey universe will experience confusion in the collection process.
One of the reasons the Seventh Circuit rejected the more widely used “least-sophisticated
consumer” standard was because that standard appeared not to appreciate this assumption.125
The marketing literature on vulnerable consumers also supports this assumption. Baker, Gentry
and Rittenburg point out that consumer vulnerability does not occur simply by virtue of a
consumer being in the class of consumers a statute was designed to protect—not everyone in that
class will experience vulnerability in a specific situation.126

are valid proxies for sophistication, although the focus of the study was on sophisticated consumers and their
likelihood of confusion in a brand extension experiment. See Empirical analysis, supra note 50 at 915 (study
“finding that education and consumer experience (but not income, age, or gender) are meaningful predictors of
consumer care [i.e., consumer sophistication].”).
123
See Consumer Psychology, supra note 50 at 587 (“Motivation and ability are each necessary but insufficient
conditions for an individual to exert cognitive effort. That is, if either motivation or ability is lacking, the individual
will exert little cognitive effort while performing a judgment task.”).
124
See e.g., Gianfranco Walsh, Thorsten Henning-Thurau & Vincent-Wayne Mitchell, Consumer Confusion
Proneness: Scale Development, Validation, and Application, 23 J. MARKETING MGMT. 697 (2007) (three
component conceptual model of consumer confusion proneness developed, operationalized and validated—looks at
similarity, overload and ambiguity in product information); John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, The Efficient
Assessment of Need for Cognition, 48 J. PERSONALITY A SSESSMENT 306 (1984) (provides scales for measuring need
for cognition).
125
See Gammon v. GC Servs., 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Literally, the least sophisticated consumer is
not merely “below average,” he is the very last rung on the sophistication ladder. Stated another way, he is the
single most unsophisticated consumer who exists….such a consumer would likely not be able to read a collection
notice with care (or at all), let alone interpret it in a reasonable fashion.”).
126
Stacey Menzel Baker, James W. Gentry & Terri L. Rittenburg, Building Understanding of the Domain of
Consumer Vulnerability, 25 J. MACROMARKETING 128 (2005) (article reviews the literature on vulnerable
consumers and offers an extension of earlier typology—both typologies include consumer sophistication as a
variable); Fred W. Morgan, Drue K. Schuler & Jeffrey J. Stoltman, A Framework for Examining the Legal Status of
Vulnerable Consumers, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 267 (1995) (reviewing case law and offering typology of
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They argue, for example, that consumer vulnerability is not the same as discrimination,
stigmatization or disadvantage, so that a consumer’s experience of any one of these conditions
does not necessarily mean the consumer will experience vulnerability.127 Marketing studies also
indicate that many consumers traditionally characterized as “vulnerable” based on demographic
characteristics or literacy levels may not actually experience harm in the marketplace or may
develop coping strategies which help them overcome their limitations.128 Baker, Gentry and
Rittenburg argue that the historical focus on “perceived vulnerability” instead of “actual
vulnerability”129 tends to stereotypically treat vulnerability as an “equilibrium state,” rather than
a “short-run phenomenon” which may ultimately have an adverse affect on these consumers;
they argue instead that “[c]onsumer vulnerability is a condition, not a status.”130
Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg’s perspective provides insight into the behavior,
characteristics and context of consumer vulnerability. Specifically, there is support for the
Seventh Circuit’s position that the unsophisticated consumer standard, and not the leastsophisticated consumer standard, better reflects the reality of most consumers, even
unsophisticated consumers, although further empirical work is needed to support this claim.131
The literature on vulnerable consumers empirically supports what the Seventh Circuit had
intuitively assumed: not all unsophisticated consumers will experience confusion within the debt
collection process.
In an extension of Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg’s analysis of consumer vulnerability,
Commuri and Ekici argue that, while the former’s insights are valuable and help avoid the
shaming and stigmatizing of consumers, policy makers also should consider a more “integrative
view of vulnerability.”132 They argue that consumer vulnerability should consider both
“transient state-based components” like individual characteristics that vary within different social
contexts, as well as “systemic class-based components,” like individual characteristics or
situational factors that cut across a whole class of consumers.133 Transient state-based
components may result in a temporary or passing state of vulnerability that all consumers, no
vulnerable consumers including consumers’ physical sensitivity and competency, mental competency and level of
sophistication within five different situational contexts).
127
See Baker, Gentry & Rittenburg, supra note 126 at 136.
128
See e.g., Roland Gau & Madhubalan Viswanathan, The Retail Shopping Experience for Low-Literate Consumers,
15 J. RES. CONSUMERS 1 (2008) (study indicates functionally low-literate consumers can develop various coping
strategies to navigate the retail environment); Natalie Ross Adkins & Julie L. Ozanne, The Low Literate Consumer,
32 J. CONSUMER RES. 93 (2005) (study identifies several coping skills used by low-literate consumers to get their
needs met in the marketplace); Debra J. Ringold, Social Criticisms of Target Marketing: Process or Product? 38
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 578 (1995) (arguing there is no empirical evidence supporting characterizing young people,
women or minorities as vulnerable—looked at target marketing of tobacco and alcohol). But cf. Madhubalan
Viswanathan, Jose Antonio Rosa & James Edwin Harris, Decision Making and Coping of Functionally Illiterate
Consumers and Some Implications for Marketing Management, 69 J. MARKETING 15 (2005) (functionally illiterate
consumers lack numeracy skills to make price-discount calculations).
129
See Baker, Gentry & Rittenburg, supra note 126 at 128 (citing N. Craig Smith & Elizabeth Cooper-Martin, Ethics
and Target Marketing: The Role of Product Harm and Consumer Vulnerability, 61 ETHICS & TARGET MARKETING
1 (1997)).
130
Id. at 137.
131
Whether the use of the unsophisticated consumer standard and its attendant procedural requirements is more
appropriate than the more widely-used least-sophisticated consumer standard is beyond the scope of the present
inquiry. Both standards were judicially created and neither is defined in the statute.
132
Suraj Commuir & Ahmet Ekici, An Enlargement of the Notion of Consumer Vulnerability, 28 J.
MACROMARKETING 183, 184 (2008).
133
Id. at 184.
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matter how highly sophisticated, may experience. For example, even a federal district judge may
undergo a period of vulnerability when grieving the death of a loved one,134 experiencing the
stress of divorce,135 or dealing with severe financial pressures.136 Conversely, class-based
components of vulnerability are viewed as more enduring or permanent like the characteristics of
consumers with developmental disabilities.137 Commuri and Ekici’s model depicts total
consumer vulnerability as the sum of both the transient, state-based consumer characteristics and
the systemic characteristics shared by a class of consumers.138
They argue that policy makers should consider both components of consumer
vulnerability because while not all consumers in a class—like a class of unsophisticated
consumers—will experience an episode of transient vulnerability—like confusion over a debt
collection letter—those unsophisticated consumers who do experience confusion are more likely
to also experience some type of underlying systemic vulnerability.139 They argue “if a
characteristic or an external condition persists across many individuals (as is often the case), then
that is reason enough for macromarketers and policy makers to adopt a respective class-based
view of consumer vulnerability.”140
As an example, Commuri and Ekici note the work by Adkins and Ozanne on literacy
wherein the latter demonstrated how low-literate consumers met their needs in the marketplace
using various coping strategies; those consumers who refused to accept the stigma of their low
literacy skills were better able to overcome their difficulties in the marketplace than those who
did.141 According to Commuri and Ekici, Adkins and Ozanne’s work provides evidence that the
presence or absence of “shame management” skills is best viewed as a systematic class-based
characteristic, and, when understood in that context, can provide a better understanding of lowliterate consumers and lead to insights for policy makers and others about how to help this class
of consumers develop.142 Commuir and Ekici urge that the recognition that systemic class-based
vulnerabilities—whether based on individual characteristics or external conditions—may make a
consumer group more susceptible to experiencing vulnerability allows policy makers to be
proactive rather than simply reactive to the problems these consumers experience in the
marketplace.143
Commuri and Ekici’s perspective does not undermine the Seventh Circuit’s approach, as
they likely would agree with the court’s position that not all consumers in the potential universe
134

See e.g., James W Gentry, Patricia F. Kennedy, Katherine Paul & Ronald Paul Hill, The Vulnerability of Those
Grieivng the Death of a Loved One: Implications for Public Policy, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 128 (1994).
135
See e.g., James H. McAlexander, John W. Schouten & Scott D. Roberts, Consumer Behavior and Divorce, 6 RES.
CONSUMER BEH. 153 (1993).
136
See e.g., Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of Practice, Research, and
Policy, 11 FED. RES. BULL. 445 (2002) (“Ineffective money management can also result in behaviors that make
consumers vulnerable to severe financial crises.”).
137
See e.g., Phylis M. Mansfield & Mary Beth Pinto, Consumer Vulnerability and Credit Card Knowledge Among
Developmentally Disabled Citizens, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 425, 434 (2008) (study classified developmentally
disabled consumers as vulnerable and finding that many of these individuals were unable “to make reasoned
assessment of the financial concepts and credit card terms.”).
138
See Commuri & Ekici, supra note 132 at 184.
139
Id. at 185.
140
Id. at 186.
141
See Natalie Ross Adkins & Julie L. Ozanne, The Low Literate Consumer, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 93 (2005).
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See Commuri & Ekici, supra note 132 at 186. See also Natalie Ross Adkins & Julie L. Ozanne, Critical
Consumer Education: Empowering the Low-Literate Consumer, 25 J. MACROMARKETING 153 (2005) (providing
alternative forms of consumer education strategies based on four types of consumer literacy profiles).
143
See Commuri & Ekici, supra note 132 at 185-86.
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of unsophisticated consumers will experience confusion in the debt collection process. A
relevant inquiry under their model, however, is whether there are any systemic variables that cut
across the broader class of consumers, regardless of their level of sophistication, which may
make them more vulnerable to confusion within the debt collection process. The court defines
the potential pool of unsophisticated consumers as “the average consumer in the lowest quartile
of consumer competence.”144 This definition implies of course that the average consumer in the
remaining 75% of the potential pool is more competent that the average consumer in the bottom
25% of the potential pool because the former has the requisite abilities and behaviors necessary
to avoid confusion.145
There are serious problems with this assumption. For example, the abilities ascribed to
consumers under the unsophisticated consumer standard assume a minimum level of financial
literacy.146 The evidence indicates that financial literacy levels among U.S. consumers are low.
For example, data recently released from the 2008 Jump$tart Coalition survey of high school
seniors, and for the first time in a national survey, college students, indicates that high school
seniors scored an average of just 48.3% and college students an average of 62.2% on a 31question exam financial literacy exam.147 Although the scores for college students improved with
every additional year of school, the study indicates that only about 25% of college students will
graduate, leaving approximately 75% of young adults lacking basic financial skills.148 Other
financial literacy studies indicate that this pattern persists across the population,149 and is
chronic.150
“Financial literacy” lacks universal definition,151 and the above studies surveyed much
that is beyond the scope of the factors defining the parameters of the unsophisticated consumer
standard. Lusardi and Mitchell, however, have effectively utilized three questions designed to
test a consumer’s understanding of percentage calculations,152 division153 and compound
144

Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007). See also supra Part III.C.
See also, Beebe supra note 75 at 2035-37 (Beebe notes that in the trademark cases “[t]he distribution of
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See supra text accompanying notes 117-18 (standard assumes consumers have basic knowledge of finance,
reasonable intelligence, and the ability to make basic logical inferences and deductions).
147
See e.g., Lewis Mandell, THE FINANCIAL LITERACY OF Y OUNG AMERICAN ADULTS at 5 (2009) (Results of the
2008 National Jump$tart Coalition Survey of High School Seniors and College Students).
148
Id.
149
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interest.154 These questions reflect a focus more in line with the FDCPA cases155 and the
unsophisticated consumer factors.156 Their results indicated that, while over 80% of the
respondents aged 51-56 correctly answered the first question requiring a percentage calculation,
fewer than 56% correctly answered the question requiring simple division.157 Respondents who
correctly answered either the first or second question also were asked to solve the third; only
18% correctly answered the question requiring an understanding of compound interest.158
A later national study of Americans by Lusardi and Tufano examining “debt literacy”
also included three different questions evaluating respondents’ understanding of compound
interest.159 Only about 36% of respondents correctly answered the compound interest rate
question.160 The second question in this later study also similarly tested the respondents’
understanding of simple interest rate calculations; only about 35% of respondents correctly
answered that question.161 Lusardi and Tufano’s third question, designed to test respondents’
understanding of the time value of money, likely requires a higher level of sophistication than
that ascribed to the unsophisticated consumer; fewer than 7% responded correctly.162
These financial literacy studies provide some evidence for valid sophistication proxies
under the unsophisticated consumer standard. For example, the 2008 Jump$start study and
Lusardi and Mitchell’s study both found that financial literacy is enhanced with education, and
the latter study also found that African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to answer
incorrectly than were white respondents.163 Lusardi and Tufano’s study also found that gender,
age, ethnicity and marital status were significant variables related to financial literacy with
women, older respondents, minorities and divorced or separated respondents scoring lower.164
These studies demonstrate that a substantial majority of consumers, and not just unsophisticated
consumers, lack basic financial literacy skills, and underscores Commuri and Ekici’s suggestion
154
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that systemic class-based characteristics, like financial illiteracy, also should be considered by
policy makers.
C. Implications for FDCPA Policy
These studies do not necessarily support a change in the factors under the Seventh
Circuits’ unsophisticated consumer standard. As noted above, the validity of the factors used in
the unsophisticated consumer standard is largely supported by evidence from the marketing and
consumer psychology literature.165 Within the context of FDCPA litigation, in fact, lowering the
standard may do more overall harm than good, as the courts and commentators have noted an
“explosion” in FDCPA litigation.166 A lower standard might lead to even further increases in
litigation under the Act. These studies, however, do provide support for the argument that the
plaintiff’s survey only be required to demonstrate a very low level of consumer confusion
between the control group and the treatment group, rather than requiring evidence that a
“significant fraction” of the treatment group was confused.167
The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the unsophisticated consumer standard over the leastsophisticated consumer standard, coupled with the former standard’s procedural requirements,
has already lowered the probability that a plaintiff can establish a violation under the Act.168 Of
course, anytime the court finds a violation of the FDCPA, they are effectuating an act of
consumer protection which benefits the entire consumer population, and not just the relevant
population of unsophisticated consumers identified by the Seventh Circuit. Setting too high a
threshold for the demonstration of consumer confusion among unsophisticated consumers (those
in the bottom 25% of consumer competence), however, not only decreases the level of protection
among that population, but also the general population of consumers (the remaining 75% of
consumers) who are not as competent as the court assumes.169 Setting a lower threshold for
consumer confusion instead recognizes the “systemic vulnerability,”170 a lack of basic financial
literacy, which cuts across the broader class of consumers, increasing the scope of the FDCPA’s
protections while maintaining the utility of the Seventh Circuit’s higher standard. Given the lack
of binding regulations under the FDCPA,171 and the emphasis on private enforcement,172 this
type of judicial intervention is warranted. Razook has argued that common lawmaking has the
“ability to imbue regulation with necessary elements of justice,” and can help “balance” the
regulatory process.173 The Seventh Circuit can achieve that balance by recognizing the
limitations in the unsophisticated consumer standard and applying that standard accordingly.
165
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The current split in the federal circuits over the appropriate consumer standard for use
under the FDCPA provides a useful foundation for the exploration of the efficacy of consumer
protection regulation. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit’s unsophisticated
consumer standard and the requirement that plaintiffs produce acceptable extrinsic evidence
under the parameters of that standard provide a basis for gaining a better understanding of the
effect of validation disclosures under the FDCPA, and consumer disclosures generally. Research
grounded in consumer psychology and marketing may provide insight into the efficacy of the
validation disclosures, and coupling those insights with research generated within the litigation
process, only increases the utility of the process. Petty has argued that society would be well
served using a variety of approaches in the regulatory process as long as “the approaches are
appropriate to the substance of the law.”174 Multiple sources, including litigation, in the
regulatory process “allows for experimentation that may evolve into consensus.”175
The recent white paper issued by the Obama administration176 also advocates that the
proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) be allowed to work with providers in
the financial services industry, offering providers immunity from liability under the relevant
regulation so that field tests assessing the efficacy of consumer disclosures can be conducted.177
All of these sources, including the research underpinning the unsophisticated consumer standard
in the Seventh Circuit can ultimately help provide critical information which can be used to
improve the FDCPA specifically and consumer disclosures generally.

law process and why it works). Razook’s work also raises interesting questions about the normative context for debt
collection and deceptive acts, or fraud under the common law, codified within the FDCPA, particularly given the
split in the federal circuits about which standard ought to be applied under the FDCPA. Also interesting is whether
either standard effectively manages to reflect the norms and/or deviations from the norms within the relevant
communities of debt collectors, lawyers, and society generally. These issues, while interesting, are beyond the
scope of the present inquiry.
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